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Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995. Pp. xvii, 367. $35.00.
I
The rapid rise in the number of mass tort claims over the past twenty years
has put a great strain on our legal system. Unlike a simple tort, in which there
is a single, identifiable wrongdoer and a definite injury, mass torts often
involve multiple exposures to harm, multiple and unidentifiable wrongdoers,
and latent injuries. These mass torts have taken a heavy toll on corporate
defendants. Litigation over silicone breast implants-a recent, notable mass tort
action-has attracted over 400,000 potential claimants,' some consolidating
their claims into a class action and others opting to pursue their claims
individually.' Dow Coming, the leading national manufacturer of breast
implants, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after the collapse of a
proposed $4.25 billion settlement In so doing, Dow Coming joins asbestos
manufacturer Johns Manville Corporation and Dalkon Shield contraceptive
manufacturer A.H. Robins on the list of formerly profitable corporate
defendants who have succumbed to Chapter 11 in the face of voluminous mass
tort claims.4
While large mass tort judgments against corporate defendants have resulted
in conservative agitation for tort reform,5 Judge Jack Weinstein finds tort law
to be deficient from the victim's point of view as well. Judge Weinstein's
judicial experience includes presiding over some of the most notable mass tort
trials in U.S. legal history.6 His ad hoc "communitarian ' '7 solutions to the
problems he faces have resulted in appellate reversal frequently enough to earn
* United States Senior District Judge, Eastern District of New York.
1. Max Boot, Tort Lawyers Gear Up for More Silicone Silliness, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A15.
2. See generally Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60 (discussing plaintiff
strategies of individual versus consolidated mass tort litigation in breast implant context).
3. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Judge Discloses New Details on Settlement of Implant Suit, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
28, 1995, at 10.
4. See The Breast Implant Tragedy, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at A14.
5. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, 'Tort Reform' Action Is Urged by Coalition, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
1995, at B5.
6. See, e.g., DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp.
902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (agent orange); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 769 F. Supp. 85 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (asbestos).
7. Weinstein discusses his view of communitarian ethics at length on pp. 46-52.
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him the nickname "Reversible Jack."' In Individual Justice in Mass Tort
Litigation, Weinstein advocates expansive revisions of legal and ethical rules
in an effort to better serve the interests of individual claimants in the mass tort
context. Most significantly, Weinstein calls for a legislative initiative that
would eliminate the need for victims to rely on tort law for compensation, or,
in the alternative, the protection of the victim community through the use of
courts' equitable powers. Weinstein's proposals, though well intentioned, fall
short of a realistic solution to the problems presented by mass torts.
Specifically, his proposed legislative initiative lacks a realistic source of
funding, and his reforms in the name of the individual actually do more to
serve the interest of the community.
II
In response to the legal system's inability to handle mass torts, Judge
Weinstein calls for a broad compensatory legal framework that would dispose
of most tort litigation. His plan includes creating a national health care system
and extending Social Security disability benefits to all persons. These reforms
would give victims a means of recovery independent of tort law (pp. 4-5,
120). Weinstein advocates making protection available through first-party
insurance or worker fringe benefits (p. 33). Government regulatory agencies
would be strengthened to monitor corporations adequately, thereby deterring
tortious behavior and effectively "serv[ing] as the first and main line of
defense" (p. 32). Weinstein also proposes enacting a uniform national tort law
to replace the many different state tort laws (pp. 4, 21, 146) and creating a
National Disaster Court to handle any "substantial" mass tort accidents (p. 34).
Critics may be quick to label Weinstein's proposals big-government
solutions. His fundamental premise, however, seems sound: In the absence of
guaranteed health care, tort law is the primary means of redress for many of
the injured. Victims without medical insurance must sue in order to purchase
the care that they need. This reliance on tort law creates incentives for victims
to exaggerate injuries both to ensure a recovery and to increase possible pain
and suffering awards. 9 A national health care system would reduce mass tort
victims' need to bring suits that inflict financial pain on corporate defendants.
Victim-claimants would have their injuries redressed without obtaining a
judgment against a corporate tortfeasor. Judges would be less inclined to use
tort law to provide victims with third-party insurance and could tailor awards
to maximize the deterrent function of the tort system.'0 In sum, corporate
8. Michele Galen, The Man Who's Cutting Through the Asbestos Mess, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 1991, at
71, 72.
9. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 586 (1985).
10. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on American
Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1339, 1353-54 (1994).
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defendants would have less financial exposure, and more victims could receive
compensation.
The most notable manner in which Weinstein's proposals would mitigate
the mass tort burden on corporate defendants is by eliminating punitive damage
awards (p. 35)." Not only would barring these awards directly reduce
damages against corporations, 2 it would also halt the great influx of claims
that often follows such awards. For example, after a jury awarded a plaintiff
$25 million in a breast implant case, the number of breast implant lawsuits
nationwide doubled in a matter of months. 3 Eliminating punitive damages
would go a long way toward cooling off the mass tort fire.
Ultimately, however, Weinstein's call for legislative action raises serious
questions of cost. He envisions a grand regulatory scheme in which
government has the ultimate responsibility for regulating corporate activity,
deterring corporate torts, and providing tort victims with health care. This call
for action comes at a time when both Medicare and Medicaid have been
targeted for reduction. In such a political environment, it is unlikely that any
broad-based legislative initiative to expand health care entitlements would
receive serious consideration. Indeed, Weinstein himself acknowledges the
danger of relying on government-supported agencies, which are subject to
political pressures and in constant danger of being emasculated with a swing
of a fiscal conservative's axe (p. 169). For Weinstein to advocate seriously for
legislative adoption of such an expansive government role, he must
simultaneously propose realistic financing measures. Without a financing
proposal, his legislative initiative remains politically unrealistic.
III
Weinstein ultimately believes that individual justice is best achieved by
protecting the interests of the community. He argues that, in the absence of a
legislative overhaul, judges should resort to using their equity powers in order
to protect the interests of the victim communities. In this regard, Individual
Justice is a misnomer: Weinstein's communitarian ethic leads him to criticize
legal rules and ethical guidelines ostensibly designed for individual protection.
A striking example is Weinstein's dissatisfaction with class action opt-out
provisions. He believes that these provisions "may make full use of the class
action device [in mass torts] impossible" (p. 26). He prefers the use of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund class actions 4 or consolidated actions modeled after
11. For additional arguments against punitive damages, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts & Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL L. REv. 415 (1994).
12. Punitive damage awards have soared recently. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993) (upholding punitive award 526 times greater than actual damages).
13. Nocera, supra note 2, at 82.
14. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) deals with class actions in which individual prosecution would "as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
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bankruptcy proceedings for resolving mass torts (pp. 134-37).'5 These actions
are preferable because they preclude individuals from opting out and pursuing
claims independently (p. 136, 155). In fact, in the Agent Orange case,
Weinstein threw out for lack of causation cases brought by veterans who took
advantage of the opt-out provision of the 23(b)(3) class action.' 6 These
veterans were thus excluded from a class settlement approved by Weinstein in
which corporate defendants paid $180 million into a settlement fund on the
conditions that this sum would represent their total liability and that individual
claims would thereafter be banned. 7 The reason for Weinstein's preference
is clear: If plaintiffs can opt out, and enough of them do so, defendant-
corporations will be disinclined to settle class actions because any settlement
will represent only a portion of their total potential liability. "Global peace"
will be impossible to achieve (p. 136). Even when defendants are inclined to
settle, the presence of pending claims filed by plaintiffs who opted out can
induce the corporations to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 8 thus placing all
potential creditors on hold and disrupting settlement negotiations.' 9 Weinstein
envisions the use of consolidated proceedings as a means not only of
compensating victims, but also of funding communitarian initiatives such as
support groups for the relatives of the injured, extensive research, medical
advice, and other remedies, the benefits of which would extend beyond those
immediately injured (pp. 7-8, 87, 96). By opting out, plaintiffs discourage
corporate defendants from settling or push such corporations into Chapter 11
bankruptcy, thus delaying or preventing community-oriented settlements.
Pursuant to his procommunity philosophy, Judge Weinstein also takes aim
at traditional rules of legal ethics. In particular, he attacks the notions that "the
plaintiffs' attorney's duty of loyalty requires her to put the client's interests
ahead of all others," and that "the lawyer has no ethical obligation to consider
the interests of third parties" (p. 66). As an example, Weinstein discusses a
defendant's demand for the inclusion of a secrecy provision in a settlement
agreement (pp. 66-67). Under traditional rules of legal ethics, the plaintiff's
attorney would have little choice but to accept a secrecy provision because the
plaintiff's interest would be served by a defendant's willingness to "sweeten"
the deal to secure such an agreement (p. 67). This ethical framework ignores
the adverse effect of lost information on the relevant community. Weinstein
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
15. Weinstein finds the bankruptcy proceeding appealing since it "give[s] the judge considerable
equitable powers of supervision" (p. 137) including the power to stay both state and federal proceedings.
16. See Nocera, supra note 2, at 75.
17. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F Supp. 902, 918-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Nocera, supra note
2, at 75 (discussing Weinstein's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss opt-out plaintiffs' individual suits).
18. Filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 prevents claims against the debtor from being litigated
during the reorganization process. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
19. See Milo Geyelin & Timothy D. Schellhardt, Dow Coming Seeks Chapter 11 Shield, Clouding
Status of Breast-Implant Pact, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1995, at A3.
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believes that there is great societal interest in knowing "what went wrong and
why" (p. 67), and in this regard "[s]ometimes the needs of individual members
of the community must yield to those of the community as a whole" (p. 68).
This communitarian ethic leads Weinstein to advocate "a new formulation of
the lawyer's ethical duty" in which the attorney considers the ultimate impact
of litigation on the community (p. 87).
Weinstein advocates the integration of modem communications technology
into the litigation process to give victims a voice and increase the flow of
information. He mentions e-mail, a 1-800 number, and cable TV links as
examples of technology that could increase participation in the legal process
(pp. 57-58). He also calls traditional notions of individual attorney-client
contact "ludicrous" when applied to mass tort cases (p. 54). He acknowledges,
however, that victims who join together in a class action are still
"surrender[ing] their rights to a system in which they have little or no input"
(p. 54). In those instances in which the attorney is unable to pursue zealously
the individual client's rights, Weinstein sees a need for the legal system to
administer some "TLC" to the victims of a mass tort (p. 55). He recommends
the use of courthouses for town meetings and encourages judges to attend such
meetings and listen to the concerns of the victim community (p. 99).20 In
support of his participation remedy, he cites studies suggesting that increasing
plaintiffs' participation in litigation results in a corresponding increase in their
perception of the result's value (p. 56).21
Such community-based solutions call the theme of "individual justice" into
question. In his concern for the community interest and judicial efficiency,
Weinstein advocates the revision of ethical guidelines and legal rules that were
specifically designed to protect individual litigants' rights. In return, he offers
litigants the opportunity to vent their frustrations to a judge, to a telephone
operator, or via the information superhighway. These alternatives are designed
to create a "belief' (p. 14) among litigants that they have participated. The
ethical codes that require zealous advocacy and legal rules that allow
individual litigants to control the course of litigation, however, do more than
just create a sense of participation-they ensure real, meaningful participation.
Weinstein's proposals for enhanced communication would provide only
superficial compensation for the loss of this meaningful, individual protection.
Perhaps Weinstein should have chosen the title "Community Justice" or even
"Judicial Pragmatism" since his proposals, though arguably protecting the
victim community, are, at least in part, at the individual victim's expense.
The danger of replacing individually oriented procedures with community-
oriented solutions is that the definition of the victim community is subject to
20. Weinstein used this technique in a case involving the Shoreham nuclear power plant controversy.
See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
21. See Tom R. T'ler The Role of Perceived Injustice In Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtrmonm
Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51 (1984).
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differing interpretations. Judge Weinstein may feel confident that he could
appropriately define such communities, but are we willing to allow all judges
to invoke their equitable powers to subordinate individual protections for the
good of a community that each judge would have the power to define? Such
case-specific definitions of the relevant community could generate more
disparities among the courts, increase forum shopping, and ultimately make
Weinstein's goal of a nationally uniform substantive law unachievable.
Individual victims are more easily identifiable than a victim community. Rules
that protect the individual provide definitive means for preventing her from
being swept aside in the name of a judicially defined greater good. An
individual's "belief' that she is participating must be based on some
guarantees, such as the right to opt out or to hire counsel who will zealously
advocate her individual case. The right to e-mail complaints or to be heard at
town meetings does not sufficiently protect individual interests in the absence
of real substantive and procedural guarantees.
Nevertheless, any criticism of Weinstein must be tempered in light of the
framework in which he works. Mass torts just do not fit the mold of traditional
litigation. Traditional canons of zealous advocacy for individual clients and
procedural opt-out rights are in large part unrealistic in the mass tort context.
Any solution, however, must still provide substantive and procedural
protections for the individual even as it accounts for the community interest.
Weinstein is more successful in describing the defects in the current legal
system to address mass tort disasters than he is in proposing a clearly superior
alternative. Although his proposals may be viewed cynically by those searching
for an idyllic legal system, they do recognize the need for tough choices.
Weinstein acknowledges the shortcomings of the legal system as it now exists
and calls on both the legislature and the judiciary to take notice of them.
IV
Absent Weinstein's proposed legislative initiative, we are left with a
pragmatic, patchwork tort system. Tort law will continue to be invoked as a
means of deterring corporate tortfeasors and compensating mass tort victims.
The judiciary will have the responsibility of ensuring that the legal system
adequately meets these goals, and meeting this responsibility may require more
judicial initiative and effort than simply a rigid application of the current legal
framework. The presence of judges (like Jack Weinstein) who are aware of the
problems mass torts entail and who are willing to look beyond the individual
parties to the broader implications of the litigation in crafting solutions-even
when this may result in a nickname such as "Reversible Jack"--suggests that
the legal system will continue to evolve to meet the mass tort challenge.
-Charles T Kimmett
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